Ethiopia After the Landslide: Power Secured, Peace Still Uncertain
Prosperity Party’s sweeping election victory has given Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed another parliamentary mandate. Yet the exclusion of Tigray, insecurity in Amhara and Oromia, and rising northern tensions mean that electoral dominance has not resolved Ethiopia’s deeper crisis.
Ethiopia’s 2026 election has delivered a decisive result for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Prosperity Party. Winning an overwhelming share of contested parliamentary seats gives the government a strong formal mandate ሥልጣን [siltan] (mandate) to govern for another term. Yet the result does not answer the larger question facing the country: whether political power can create peace when many communities remain excluded, insecure, or distrustful of national institutions. Ethiopia’s future will depend not only on who controls parliament, but on whether citizens across its regions believe that they have a meaningful place in the country’s political life.
An election is meant to give people a voice, but participation was uneven across the country. Tigray did not take part in the vote, while polling in parts of Amhara and Oromia was disrupted by conflict and security concerns. This raises difficult questions about representation ውክልና [wikilina] (representation) because millions of citizens cannot easily feel included in a political process from which they were absent. The problem of exclusion መገለል [megelel] (exclusion) is not only legal or procedural. It can also create a lasting feeling that national decisions are being made without the participation of people most affected by conflict.
For the government, the election result is likely to be presented as evidence of public confidence and political continuity. Supporters will argue that Ethiopia needs stability, economic reform, infrastructure development, and a government capable of acting decisively in a difficult regional environment. They may see the outcome as an opportunity to strengthen security ደህንነት [dehinnet] (security) and push forward with reforms that have been delayed by war, debt pressure, and instability. But political strength does not automatically create legitimacy ህጋዊነት [higgawinet] (legitimacy) when important regions remain outside the electoral process or when opposition groups say that the political environment is too restricted for fair competition.
The deepest uncertainty surrounds Tigray. The Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 stopped the main phase of the devastating war between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, but it did not resolve every issue that had fuelled the conflict. A ceasefire የተኩስ አቁም [yetekus aqum] (ceasefire) can halt fighting, yet peace depends on far more than the absence of gunfire. The real challenge is implementation ተግባራዊነት [tegbrawinet] (tegbrawinet), including the return of displaced people, the restoration of services, the future of the regional administration, and the settlement of territorial disputes.
The TPLF’s restoration of its pre-war political structures has increased concern that the fragile arrangement in Tigray could collapse. Supporters of the party argue that Addis Ababa failed to meet key commitments and left the region with an uncertain political future. Federal authorities and international critics, however, have viewed the move as a challenge to the peace agreement and a possible step toward renewed confrontation. This is why de-escalation ውጥረት ማሳነስ [wutiret masanes] (de-escalation) is urgently needed rather than another cycle of military signalling. The deeper problem is mistrust አለመተማመን [alemetamamen] (mistrust), built over years of war, broken agreements, public accusations, and competing claims to authority.
Reports of military mobilisation and recruitment in Tigray have made the atmosphere even more tense. Such reports must be treated carefully because local authorities have denied forced recruitment and have described training as preparation for self-defence. Still, any renewed recruitment ምልመላ [milimela] (recruitment) can intensify fear among young people and families who have already lived through one catastrophic war. The need for independent evidence ማስረጃ [masreja] (masreja) is therefore essential before allegations become excuses for escalation. In a region shaped by propaganda, trauma, and political rivalry, unverified claims can become as dangerous as confirmed events.
Eritrea remains another major source of uncertainty. The 2018 peace agreement between Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki was once celebrated as a regional breakthrough, but relations have deteriorated sharply since the Tigray war. Eritrea’s involvement in that conflict, Ethiopia’s repeated discussion of Red Sea access, and broader competition in the Horn of Africa have all made the northern border more sensitive. Claims of a formal Eritrean Tigrayan alliance should not be treated as established fact, but the possibility of temporary tactical contacts cannot be ignored. This is precisely why regional leaders need restraint ራስን መቆጣጠር [rasin meqotater] (restraint) rather than public threats that make every contact appear to be a declaration of war.
The risks extend beyond Tigray. Armed conflict in Amhara and Oromia continues to damage daily life, disrupt transport, weaken local economies, and make political participation more difficult. The federal government faces a real challenge in responding to armed movements without treating all regional grievances as security threats. A durable solution will require more than military operations because conflict often grows where people feel politically unheard, economically excluded, or vulnerable to abuse. Meaningful mediation ሽምግልና [shimigilina] (mediation) can create space for dialogue before local tensions become national crises. It must also involve accountability ተጠያቂነት [teteyaqinet] (accountability) for violence against civilians, regardless of who committed it.
Ethiopia’s political challenge is therefore not simply to prevent another war. It is to repair the relationships between the federal state, regional governments, political parties, communities, and citizens who no longer trust one another. The country needs a broader process of reconciliation እርቅ [erq] (reconciliation) that recognises loss, displacement, fear, and injustice across different regions. Reconciliation cannot mean asking victims to forget what happened or asking communities to accept silence in the name of national unity. It must mean creating conditions in which people can seek justice, return home safely, rebuild livelihoods, and participate in public life without being treated as enemies.
The role of public debate will also be crucial. A country facing multiple crises needs journalists, researchers, civic organisations, religious leaders, local councils, and community groups that can speak honestly about insecurity and economic hardship. A wider civic space የሲቪክ ቦታ [yesivik bota] (civic space) would allow citizens to challenge policy, investigate abuses, and organise peacefully around local concerns. It would also strengthen pluralism ብዝሃነት [bizhanet] (pluralism) by making room for different political views, identities, and regional priorities without turning disagreement into disloyalty. A political system becomes more secure when criticism is allowed to become debate rather than being pushed underground.
Economic policy will shape whether the new government can build confidence. Ethiopia’s leaders are trying to manage inflation, foreign exchange shortages, debt restructuring, infrastructure needs, and pressure for private-sector reform. These policies may be necessary, but they will not create stability if households continue to struggle with food prices, unemployment, transport costs, and unequal access to basic services. National resilience ጽናት [tsinat] (resilience) should not mean asking citizens to endure endless hardship. It should mean creating systems that protect people during economic shocks and allow them to imagine a future beyond survival.
The central question after the election is whether Prosperity Party’s large majority will be used to consolidate power or to widen the political settlement. A government with strong parliamentary control could choose to ignore criticism and rely on security institutions to manage unrest. Or it could use its authority to support dialogue, constitutional reform, regional cooperation, and credible peace initiatives. Ethiopia’s long-term stability depends on coexistence አብሮ መኖር [abro menor] (coexistence) among communities with different identities and political aspirations. The country will not become secure because one side wins every argument, but because its people can disagree, compete, and seek justice without fearing that disagreement will lead to violence.
Key Amharic Vocabulary
ሥልጣን [siltan] mandate
ውክልና [wikilina] representation
መገለል [megelel] exclusion
ደህንነት [dehinnet] security
ህጋዊነት [higgawinet] legitimacy
የተኩስ አቁም [yetekus aqum] ceasefire
ተግባራዊነት [tegbrawinet] implementation
ውጥረት ማሳነስ [wutiret masanes] de-escalation
አለመተማመን [alemetamamen] mistrust
ምልመላ [milimela] recruitment
ማስረጃ [masreja] evidence
ራስን መቆጣጠር [rasin meqotater] restraint
ሽምግልና [shimigilina] mediation
ተጠያቂነት [teteyaqinet] accountability
እርቅ [erq] reconciliation
የሲቪክ ቦታ [yesivik bota] civic space
ብዝሃነት [bizhanet] pluralism
ጽናት [tsinat] resilience
አብሮ መኖር [abro menor] coexistence
